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The impact on internal migration of the recent Customs Union (CU)
agreement between Turkey and the European Union (EU) has been
studied with an intra-industry trade Applied General Equilibrium
(AGE) model with intersectoral capital mobility, under two
alternative specifications for the labour market: the traditional Harris-
Todaro approach and the existence of a 'wage curve' in the urban
sector. The numerical results show that, under both specifications, the
CU leads to migration from rural to urban areas, despite agriculture
remaining protected; causes a reduction of the urban unemployment
rate and the urban-rural wage gap as suggested by theoretical studies;
whilst raises the capital rent, a counter intuitive result with respect to
the dual economy literature. Both scenarios suggest that internal
migration is economically desirable, as it would contribute to a large
rise in welfare. The study also shows that the proposal of uniformly
subsidising the entire labour market maximises welfare, but the
possibility that the high wage union sector can cream off more rents,
and the large amount of financial resources required, make this policy
unfeasible. It might be thought that the results of this kind of exercise
would be highly sensitive to the assumptions made about the labour
market. One of the contributions of this paper is to demonstrate that
that is not the case.
KEYWORDS: Customs Union, Internal Migration, AGE analysis,
Turkey.
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References 411. Introduction
Internal migration is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey. According to official
statistics based on the 1990 census of population, four million people (8 per cent of
the entire Turkish population in 1990) permanently migrated between 1985 and
1990. The region which attracted the largest amount of migration inflow is
Marmara with a net migration of 840,652 individuals (78 per cent of whom settled
in Istanbul).
1 Most people migrate from eastern to western Turkey and have
virtually no schooling.
2 These migrants worked in villages as agricultural
employees and, as a result, their job opportunities in the West are limited to manual
work. Due to the recent CU agreement between Turkey and the EU, the pressure of
1 The reasons for this large internal migration flow can be explained with the standard 'push' and
'pull' factors. The most important 'push' factors are: (i) the high share of population living in the
sub-districts and villages (41% in 1990); (ii) the relative limited amount of cultivated area (less
than 3 Hectares per agricultural worker in 1994); (iii) the low agricultural productivity (the value
added per worker produced in agriculture was one fifth that produced in manufacturing in 1995);
(iv) the poor contemporaneous and expected quality of life by remaining in the villages (for
example the infant mortality rate is 7-8% in the eastern regions and around 5% in the western
regions). Whilst, the most important 'pull' factors are: (i) the high demand of manufacturing
labour as a result of the industrialisation process, especially in Istanbul and Izmir (almost
1,300,000 jobs have been created by manufacturing and services during 1988-1994); (ii) the
higher manufacturing wages (the nominal manufacturing wage was on average twice as high as
the nominal agricultural wage in the 1980's); (iii) the certainty of a continuous income and social
security associated with a secure and formally regulated permanent job; (iv) the better quality of
life in living in urban areas, associated with a far better access to subsidised public services, such
as schools and health care. In addition, another important pull factor explaining the high
migration flow in Turkey is the possibility for migrants to live in squatter settlements in the
outskirts of cities {Gecekondu). The largest cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara
are characterised by the squatter housing phenomenon. Thus, the possibility of living in
Gecekondu allows villagers to migrate without incurring large costs.
Although, in relative terms, the better educated individuals are more likely to search for a job
with a higher return (Tunali, 1996).unskilled labour on cities could exacerbate, because of improved employment
opportunities in labour-intensive manufacturing, which have now a better access to
the EU market. In fact, an early study shows that this preferential trading
agreement will have a major impact on the reallocation of resources among sectors,
favouring the expansion of manufacturing activities (De Santis, 1997). It is
important to stress that, according to the CU protocol, agriculture continues to
remain a sector which is excluded from the trade-enhancing options of the CU.
This is because, given the system of protection, as defined by the European
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the size of Turkish agriculture (i.e.
Turkish agriculture comprised 15% of GDP and employed 48% of civilian
employment in 1995), any agreement on free trade in agriculture between the EU
and Turkey was considered unacceptable by European policy-makers.
Consequently, agribusiness activities (i.e. primary agriculture and food industries),
for which Turkey has a comparative advantage, have not been included in the CU
protocol. More precisely, the CU agreement between Turkey and the EU, which
will be completely adopted by the Turkish government by the year 2001, consists
mainly of the following three measures: (i) elimination of tariff barriers on mining
and industrial products imported from the EU; (ii) adoption of the European
common external tariff rates on mining and industrial products imported from the
Rest of the World (RoW); (iii) elimination of export quotas in the form ofVoluntary Export Restraints (VERs) on textiles and wearing apparel shipped to the
EU.
3 Since the duties levied by the EU on Turkish (non-CAP) goods are zero, and
the common external tariff rates are generally lower than the Turkish applied rates,
one might argue that resources could be redirected from import-competing
industries towards the widely protected agricultural activities so as to favour the
migration flow from urban to rural areas and, as a result, reduce the pressure on
cities. However, one needs to consider that firstly, most of the protected
agribusiness industrial activities are located in urban areas; secondly, the
elimination of VERs will favour the expansion of export-oriented industries, such
as textiles and apparel, whose activities are located in urban areas; and finally, the
interactions among sectors are difficult to capture. As a result, the impact of the
CU agreement on Turkish internal migration is an important empirical question.
In order to understand the direction of the migration flow and to determine
its magnitude, I use an AGE model for Turkey, which is based upon the basic
Harris-Todaro hypothesis that migration is induced by the expected urban-rural
wage differential (Harris and Todaro, 1970). The AGE model incorporates VERs
3 In exchange, Turkey would have received 1.48 billions ECU in a five year period to compensate
for a loss in tariff revenues. The financial flow from the EU has been blocked with a veto by
Greece for political reasons related to the Cyprus issue. As a result, the Turkish government
argues that the CU agreement is unfair, as Turkey would suffer from trade liberalisation.
However, this argument does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. De Santis (1997) and Harrison,
et. al (1997) have shown in a static framework that the CU agreement would lead to a slight
increase in welfare, as resources are better reallocated among sectors.and import tariffs at sectoral and regional level. It is characterised by (i) intra-
industry trade in order to capture the cross-hauling phenomenon, rather than the
quite strong assumption of specialised trade flows, which is typically made in
theoretical two-sector models; (ii) the use of intermediate inputs to capture sectoral
interdependencies, as suggested by Beladi and Marjit (1996); (iii) intersectorally
capital mobility, as assumed by Corden and Findlay (1975), Hazari and Sgro
(1992) and Chen and Choi (1994); and (iv) an extended Harris-Todaro migration
equation, according to which migration takes place up to the point where the
expecfed urban wage equates to the rural wage, adjusted for a parameter which
reflects either the fact that the migrants' chance of finding an urban formal sector
job is lower than for persons who are already in towns searching for work (Fields,
1975), or the farmers' risk aversion to migrate (Corden and Findlay, 1975; Lucas,
1997). In summary, the AGE model presented in this study cannot be regarded as a
representation of a dual economy. Consequently, the theoretical results of the
literature that, in a small open economy with capital mobility, trade liberalisation
decreases the return to capital, increases the rural wage, decreases urban
unemployment and raises welfare (Hazari and Sgro, 1992; Chen and Choi, 1994;
Beladi and Marjit, 1996), are not necessarily valid.
The Harris-Todaro model is probably the most powerful approach in
explaining internal migration in a general equilibrium setting. In Harris andTodaro, the ultimate cause of urban unemployment is an institutionally determined
urban minimum real wage, which is maintained above the clearing condition. In
Turkey, the minimum wage is determined every year by the Minimum Wage
Setting Commission. However, the net minimum wage is well below the base wage
in both the formal private and public sectors (IMF, 1997). Consequently, the cause
of Turkish urban unemployment cannot be found in the minimum wage legislation.
Certainly, Turkey is not a dual economy a la Harris-Todaro. However, it must be
stressed that the average real wage in Turkish manufacturing moved around a
constant value during the period 1991-1995 (see Fig. 1, which shows the average
monthly nominal wage rate in manufacturing deflated by either the monthly
general wholesale price index or the monthly urban areas consumer price index).
This statistical information does allow still for examining the impact of the CU
agreement under the Harris-Todaro constant wage assumption.
4
[Insert Figure 1]
The Harris-Todaro model implies a positive relationship between
unemployment and urban wage. However, recent empirical studies have argued
that the labour market, in developed countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) as
A survey discussing the urban labour market pathologies and the reasons beyond the labour
market clearing condition failure can be found in Lucas (1997).well as in developing countries (Hoddinott, 1996), is characterised by a 'wage
curve', that is a negative relationship between the contemporaneous wage rate and
unemployment.
5 Given this debate, I have examined the impact of the CU
agreement on Turkish internal migration by considering two alternative scenarios:
the so called Harris-Todaro scenario with a sector-specific constant wage; and the
so called 'wage curve' scenario which, conversely, is characterised by a negatively
sloped relationship between the urban wage rate and urban unemployment.
6
It is important to emphasise that the parameters of the model used in this
study have been calibrated, a procedure which does not involve any testing
procedure (Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Consequently, the numerical findings
must be cautiously interpreted, and are valid only in the light of these two
scenarios. Obviously, econometric studies are needed to understand the features of
the labour market in Turkey.
The results of the simulations indicate that welfare would increase under
both scenarios, and unemployment and the urban-wage gap would decrease in
5 Partridge and Rickman (1997) have recently challenged Blanchflower and Oswald's analysis by
presenting new empirical evidence for the US, which supports the traditional view that a positive
relationship exists between regional wages and regional unemployment.
6 Note that the unemployment rate in Turkey was in the range of 6.6%-9% in the period 1988-
1995. In particular, the unemployment rate ranged between 10% and 13.7% in urban areas, and
between 3.9%-5.9% in rural areas (SIS, 1997), which implies that official unemployment in
Turkey is largely confined to the urban sector. However, it must be said that the disguised
unemployment in rural areas is not captured by the official employment figures (IMF, 1997). This
paper assumes that unemployment is an urban phenomenon.accordance with the theory;
7 whereas, migration would take place from rural to
urban areas and capital rent would increase, in contrast with the dual economy
literature.
The study also shows that the proposal suggested by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1974) of uniformly subsidising the entire labour market maximises
welfare in both scenarios, leading to full employment in the Harris-Todaro
scenario, and an extremely low unemployment rate in the 'wage curve' scenario.
The study also consists of a further four sections. Section 2 defines the
algebraic specification of the model. Section 3 describes the benchmark and the
calibration of parameters. Section 4 explores the effects of the policy simulations,
and the final section provides some conclusions.
2. Model specification
The trade model presented in this study is a static multi-sector AGE model for
Turkey with perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The model is
characterised by intra-industry trade as each tradeable commodity is exchanged in
five different markets: the domestic market; the markets for imports from the EU,
7 It is usually argued, especially by some politicians, that a tariff reduction leads to an increase in
unemployment. Conversely, in a Harris-Todaro framework, it is shown that trade liberalisation
causes a decline in unemployment (Hazari and Sgro, 1992). If the urban manufacturing sector
supplies a sizeable input for the rural sector, then a tariff fall can increase employment, even if the
protected sector is labour intensive (Beladi and Marjit, 1996).
10and the RoW; and the markets for export to the EU, and the RoW. This implies that
although Turkey is assumed to be a price taker of international goods, domestic
prices are endogenously determined. The AGE model specifies the effective trade
barriers (i.e. tariffs and quota) with the EU and the RoW in the form of ad valorem
tariff equivalent. With regard to the equilibrium conditions in goods and factors
markets, the final demand and the intermediate demand of goods is equal to the
domestic supply plus imports; the total capital demand is equal to the total capital
supply; and the total labour demand is equal to the total labour force minus urban
unemployment. The numeraire of the model is represented by the Laspeyre's price
index of domestic goods.
To simplify the presentation, the specification of the model is divided into
six components: production technology and factor demand, internal migration, the
'wage curve', treatment of traded goods and foreign sector closure, household
revenues and consumption, government revenues and expenditure.
2.1. Technology and factor demand
The production technology is described by a two-stage nested separable CES
function. At the first stage, sectoral production is generated as a Leontief function
between raw-material inputs, which are assumed to be strictly complementary, and
the value added, which is, at the second stage, a CES combination of labour and
11capital. The demand for factor inputs is derived by solving the two-stage dual
problem, such that producers behave competitively and the factor returns equal
their marginal revenue product. More specifically, the labour demand in
agriculture, La, and the labour demand in the remaining sectors of the economy,
Ls, can be written as follows:
(1) La = Oa~'5a^vv
a
(2) Ls - O/'S/'w*
where i = a^Js, Yt denotes sectoral production, w
a and w
s the wage rates in rural
and urban areas, r the capital rent, <!>, and 8, the shift and the share parameter of
the CES sectoral production function, and £,- the sectoral elasticity of substitution
among labour and capital.
It is assumed that factor inputs are mobile between sectors. Total capital
demand always equates exogenous aggregate capital; whilst total labour demand,




Harris and Todaro (1970) show that in equilibrium there is no incentive to migrate
if the rural wage equates the expected urban wage. However, estimates of the
earning gap for several developing countries suggest that an equilibrium would
occur at large unemployment rates in urban areas.
8 As a result, the Harris-Todaro
approach has been extended by taking into account a parameter, X, which reflects
either the fact that migrants suffer more extensive periods of unemployment than
already settled urban residents, who are also searching Tor work (Fields, 1977), or
the risk aversion to migrate on behalf of rural workers (Corden and Findlay, 1975;
Lucas, 1997). Thus, this extension allows for more realistic calculations of
equilibrium unemployment rates. The extended Harris-Todaro migration equation
takes the following form:
8 According to recent estimates for Turkey (Bulutay, 1995), the nominal manufacturing wage was
on average twice as high as the nominal agricultural wage in the 1980's. The Harris-Todaro
model would therefore require an urban unemployment rate of 50% in equilibrium. However, the
official statistics for Turkey suggest that the urban unemployment rate was around 11% in the
same period.
132.3. The wage curve
As estimated by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for several developed countries,
and by Hoddinott (1996) for Cote d'lvoire, a low-income economy with a 1995 per
capita GNP equal to one fourth that of Turkey, economies are characterised by a
long-run negative relationship between the wage rate and unemployment, with an
elasticity value approaching to - 0.1. As pointed out by Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994), the Harris-Todaro concept of compensating differentials across regions is
compatible with a negatively-sloped relationship between the contemporaneous
wage rate and unemployment, because it is the 'permanent' value of pay which is
positively related to unemployment in a long-run relationship. Unfortunately, no
one has estimated this relationship for Turkey, nevertheless in the 'wage curve'





Note that the negative relationship between wage rate and unemployment can be
theoretically explained with the 'efficiency wage' hypothesis or with bargaining
models between firms and trade unions. Thus, (5) should not be treated as an ad
hoc specification.
9 Equations (1) - (5) endogenously determine w
a, w
s, La, Ls
9 For a detailed discussion, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).
' 14and U. Obviously, the Harris-Todaro scenario implies w
s exogenous and the
elimination of (5) from the system of the equations.
2.4. Treatment of traded goods and foreign sector closure
2.4.1. Imports
As far as the imports are concerned, on the supply side, the small country
assumption is postulated with respect to both regions. On the import demand side,
a three stage nested separable CES function is employed. Thus, it is assumed that
buyers first decide between composite commodities, then decide between
domestically produced goods and the composite imported commodities, and then
choose between imports from the EU, Mf
v, and imports from the RoW, Mf°" ,
with elasticity of substitution u.,, according to the Armington specification, which


















15where pwml and pwmi ° are the fixed world prices of similar imports produced
by the EU and the RoW, respectively; and tmf
v and tmf
oW are the applied ad
valorem regional import tariff rates, gross of the applied ad valorem Mass Housing




c denotes the composite imports; A, and a, are the shift and the share
parameters of the CES import aggregation function.
The acceptance of the 1996 CU protocol implies that for mining and
industrial products tmf
v has to be set equal to zero and tmf
oW has to be set equal
to the European common external tariff. The modification of tariff rates leads to a
change in relative prices, which will affect the demand of imports and, at the upper
level, the demand of the domestically produced goods and the demand of
composite goods.
2.4.2. Exports and VERs
With regard to exports, on the demand side, the small country assumption implies
the export demand functions to both regions to be infinitely elastic. Hence, the
Turkish export production is totally absorbed by foreign trade partners at world
1
0 Turkey has levied this surcharge on imports since 1984, the year of the Housing Fund law
approved by the Turkish Parliament to finance the government's low cost housing scheme for
poor and middle-class income households. The Mass Housing Fund duty will be phased out in
1998 (GATT, 1994).
16prices. However, for goods still subject to VERs, the domestic supply price of
exports, pef
v, is endogenously determined by the amount of output which is





where pwe." is the fixed price of exports prevailing in the EU market, and qrf
AJ
represents the ad valorem export quota premium parameter on Turkish textiles and
apparel. When qrt
EV is zero, the domestic supply price vector of exports to the EU
is equal to the price vector prevailing in the EU market."
On the supply side, the export supply functions to the EU, £/
:(/, and the
RoW, Ef
oW, are derived by maximising total export sale revenues subject to the
export possibility frontier, Ef, which is defined by a constant elasticity of





Note that the sectors subject to VERs until year 2001 are only textiles and apparel. The quota
premium for other sectors is zero.
17(10) £*°" = B"
•RoW
where /?we( is the fixed price of exports prevailing in the RoW market, r\( the
elasticity of transformation, B, and (3, the shift and the share parameters of the
CET export aggregation function. The composite export, Ef', is in turn derived by
maximising total sales (domestic sales, plus export sales) subject to the production
possibility frontier, which is a transformation function of the domestic good and
the composite export with constant elasticity.
The rents from VERs, VERf
v, which are allocated to the Turkish exporting
sectors,
1
2 and then transferred to households, are proportional to the agreed quota
premium and the level of exports:
(11) VER,
EU ^qr^pe^E™.
The EU does not levy any tariff on Turkish mining and manufacturing exports, but
it imposes quota restrictions on Turkish textiles and apparel. With the
implementation of CU agreement, qr^
v is zero, the quota rents disappear and
Since the Turkish government does not officially recognise any quota restriction, VERs
agreements could only be made with Turkish industry associations (GATT, 1994). Thus, the rents
from VERs accrued to the exporting firms which were able to obtain the export quota documents
for deliveries to the EU.
18pi I
pe
EU = PWEi . This will affect sectoral exports and domestic production
decisions.
2.4.3. Foreign sector closure
The current account deficit, CA, is exogenously specified. Thus, the equilibrium in
the balance of payments is:
-RoW
(12)
l W EU Row rRow\,-pr:
\^pwei Et +pwej £, j+CA = i
E
l
 EU \*EU , V"
 RoW \4R0W I
pwmi Mi + 2, pwmt M,
i \ i J
2.5. Household revenues and consumption
Since the Turkish government did not take part in the VERs arrangements with the
EU, the rents accrued directly to the private companies, who then redistributed
them to shareholders in the form of dividends. As a consequence, the source of
private income, HR, originates from wage payments, returns to capital, plus rents
from VERs. In addition, the representative household pays lump-sum taxes to the
government, THG, which are endogenously specified to perform a revenue neutral
tariff reform. Then,
(13) HR = Y
w°
La + 5>% + '£VERi
EU ~ THG.
19Since the model is static, the household utility function is defined only on
composite commodities. Because of lack of data on the values of the elasticity of
substitution among commodities for each household group, consumer preferences
have been described simply by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. The household
consumption behaviour is therefore represented by the following Marshallian
demand functions:
where y, denotes household budget shares and pi the price of composite
commodities.
2.6. Government revenues and expenditure
The government levies various taxes in order to finance its expenditures: a direct
tax on household income; duties on imported goods; indirect taxes on goods and
services, and lump-sum taxes. The government is a separate consuming agent;
however its consumption decisions are not affected by price changes. In fact,
public expenditure is represented by an exogenous consumption of goods and
services in real terms. The endogenous lump-sum taxes guarantee that total public
revenues remain constant.
203. Benchmark and calibration
The theoretical model outlined above requires a benchmark data-set to calibrate
unknown parameters, such that the observed value of endogenous variables
constitutes an equilibrium of the numerical model (Mansur and Whalley, 1984).
The benchmark used for this study is based upon a data-set employed and
described in detail in De Santis (1997). Its main source is a 1990 Social
Accounting Matrix for Turkey (De Santis and Ozhan, 1995, 1997), which is in turn
mainly based upon the official 1990 Input-Output (I-O) table for Turkey (SIS,
1994b). Activities and commodities are disaggregated into 20 different types and
classified according to the 1-0 table classification.
1
3 The accounts for imports and
exports are disaggregated to model the relations with the EU and the RoW.
1
4
Table 1 shows the share of labour and capital in output, and the intensity of
factors in production. The 1-0 table for Turkey defines the cost of labour in terms
of wages and salaries (i.e. compensation of employees) and the operating surplus
as a balancing residual. This implies that agriculture, which is dominated by self-
employed and unpaid family labour, would be characterised by an underestimated
1
3 The 1990 Input-Output table for Turkey comprises 64 sectors. Since the formation of the CU
between Turkey and the EU involves only mining and manufacturing commodities, I have mainly
aggregated the sectors subject to the CAP, mining and services. Mining has been aggregated
because it is a very small sector in terms of share in the GDP, labour force employed and volume
of trade.
1
4 The EU is composed of 15 countries: 12 members existing in 1990, plus the new members
Finland, Austria and Sweden.
21ratio between labour and capital.
1
5 In fact, according to the 1990 1-0 table, the ratio
between operating surplus and compensation of employees in agriculture, animal
husbandry, forestry and fisheries is on average equal to 7.9. Since this would bias
the results of the policy experiments, I have calculated the total farmers' earnings
in Turkish agriculture for the year 1990, by using as a basis the average nominal
wage in agriculture estimated by Bulutay for the year 1989 (Bulutay, 1995).
1
6 The
new estimate for the primary sector as a whole is reported in Table 1, under the
heading of 'agriculture'. It appears that the labour intensive sectors are agriculture,
beverage-tobacco, transport equipment, electricity-gas-waterworks, construction
and other services. Whereas the most important capital intensive sectors are
leather-fur products, petroleum-coal products, metal products, and transport-
communication. Although this might be counter intuitive for leather-fur products,
it must be stressed that this sector is very small. According to the benchmark data
set used for this study, leather-fur products comprised only 0.26% of Turkey's
GDP at factor cost (SIS, 1994b) and 0.21% of Turkish civilian employment (SIS,
1994a) in 1990. Thus, this statistical outlier, which might be due to the large
profits made by this sector in 1990, should not bias the results of the simulations.
1
5 Bulutay (1995) argues that self-employed and unpaid family labour comprise almost 95% of
the employed persons in Turkish agriculture.
161 have also considered the fact that the index of prices received by farmers increased by 62.8%
from 1989 to 1990 (SPO, 1996), and that the full time equivalent work in agriculture is 41% of
the entire time, as has been estimated for similar European Mediterranean countries (EC, 1996).
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Source: De Santis (1997) for agriculture, and De Santis and Ozhan (1995) for other sectors.
As I have already mentioned, Bulutay (1995) estimates that the nominal
agricultural wage was half the nominal manufacturing wage in the 1980's. This
estimate, plus the fact that the unemployment rate in Turkish urban areas is 11%,
23allows me to endogenously calibrate X, which is needed for the Harris-Todaro
migration equation. The parameter X is calibrated to be equal to 1.78, in
accordance with the theory which requires in the case of risk aversion Thv
s > w
a,
where FI is the probability of obtaining a formal sector urban job (Lucas, 1997).
The tariff collection rates have been derived by using an unpublished document of
the SIS and an unpublished thesis (Kose, 1995), whose aggregate values are
consistent with the data reported by the 1-0 table at sectoral level. The quota
premium and the European common external tariff have been selected respectively
from Harrison, et al. (1997) and the Commission of the European Communities
(1990). Since the EU imports a large number of differentiated commodities from
non-member countries, which are subject to a large range of different duties, the
mode has been employed in this study as the average European common external
tariff. The duties levied by the EU on Turkish goods are zero.
With regard to the elasticity values, the factor substitution elasticities, the
Armington trade elasticities, and the elasticities of transformation have been
selected from Harrison, et al. (1992), and some of them have been adjusted for
differences in sectoral aggregation. With regard to the elasticity of the 'wage
curve', because of the lack of data, I assume that the evidence reported by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for several developed countries, and by
24Hoddinott (1996) for Cote d'lvoire, is also valid for Turkey. Thus, e, is set equal
to-0.1.
4. The revenue-neutral tariff reform scenarios
4.1. The impact of the CU agreement
According to the regional economic integration agreement between Turkey and the
EU, the member countries remove tariffs and quotas on mining and manufacturing
commodities which circulate within the CU, and apply a common external tariff on
these commodities from outside the CU. As a result, nominal protection rates on
goods subject to the European CAP (that is, agricultural and food processed
commodities) remain unchanged. A lump sum tax has been used as a policy
instrument manoeuvrable by policy-makers to perform a revenue-neutral tariff
reform.
Table 2 reports the economic impact of policy simulations on welfare,
sectoral output, employment and capital, under both the Harris-Todaro scenario
and the 'wage curve' scenario. The results of the policy simulations are
extraordinarily similar under these alternative hypothesis for the labour market.
25Table 2 The impact of the CU on welfare, GNP, output,
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26More precisely, the partial trade liberalisation policy favours a positive re-
allocation of resources in Turkey: aggregate output, measured by the Laspeyre's
quantity index, increases by 1.6%-1.9%, and GNP rises by 0.9%-1% in real terms.
The efficiency gain generates an increment on welfare, measured by the Hicksian
equivalent income variation, equal to 1.4%-1.6%, which is a large estimate if
compared with previous findings, where welfare would increase by 0.4% under
wage flexibility and 0.8% in a context of real wage rigidity (De Santis, 1997).
1
7
The welfare benefits of this regional trade agreement are estimated to be equal to
1.8-2 billion 1990 US dollars.
1
8 This implies that movements of labour among
Turkish regions are economically desirable, in accordance with recent theoretical
findings (Chen and Choi, 1994) and, most importantly, regardless of the
assumptions postulated for the labour market.
Turkey will face a large reallocation of resources. The major growth sectors,
for which Turkey has a comparative advantage, are textiles (27.1%-28.3%),
wearing apparel (84.6%), leather-fur products (43.5%-69.3%), and footwear
(205.7%-209.4% ). Given the ex-ante high applied tariff rates on wearing apparel
1
7 It must be stressed that, in my previous work (De Santis, 1997), I used the indirect tax rate to
perform a revenue neutral tariff reform. In other words, an alternative distortion is brought into
the economy. However, this must be regarded as a second best policy, as domestically produced
goods and imports from the EU are treated equally after the tariff reform. This assumption
contributes in part to the lower estimates of the welfare gain.
1
8 The average conversion factor for 1990 is an estimate of the IMF: 2608.6 Turkish Lira for 1 US
dollar (IMF, 1995).
27and footwear imported from the EU, one would expect an increase of imports of
these goods, and eventually a contraction of their production, as their domestic
production is imperfect substitute to imports. However, despite the large rise of
imports of wearing apparel and footwear from the EU, output contraction does not
occur; quite the opposite, these sectors record a large growth, firstly, because
imports are diverted (imports from the RoW decline), and secondly, because
wearing apparel is characterised by a high positive revealed comparative advantage
(RCA), since exports of this industry comprise 9.4% of total exports.
1
9 The large
expansion of textiles, wearing apparel, leather-fur products and footwear generates
a large demand of factor inputs. Thus, the second striking result of the simulations
is that, despite the protection of the primary sector, the CU favours the migration
from rural to urban areas (Table 3). Output growth in textiles, wearing apparel,
footwear, leather-fur products, activities which are located in urban areas, is the
source of the rural-urban migration flow. Despite the large reallocation of
resources within the economy, the impact on the gap between the urban wage rate
and the rural wage rate is found to be small.
In support of this finding, it is important to consider a study by Celasun (1994), which
measures the RCA for 26 Turkish industries for the period 1987-89. This study shows that the
sector having the highest positive RCA value is textiles-clothing-shoes.
28Table 3 The impact of the CU on migration, unemployment,
























Hence, it is the higher demand of labour in urban areas which is the key 'pull'
factor influencing the decision by rural workers to migrate.
2
0 It is important to
emphasise that the theoretical literature, which is based on a two-sector dual
economy, predicts an increase in the demand of agricultural labour and urban-rural
migration, as a result of tariff reduction in protected manufacturing activities. The
opposite result obtained in this paper is mainly due to the intra-industry trade
2
0 This finding is consistent with the current view in Turkey. Bulutay (1995) argues that the
creation of jobs by firms in the largest Turkish cities is the main 'pull' factor of the rural-urban
migration phenomenon after 1950. He points out that the gap between the urban wage rate and the
rural wage rate is not a fundamental explanatory variable of internal migration in Turkey simply
because this gap always existed and, in the last decades, tended to decline, rather than widen.
29assumption, which allows all sectors to be treated simultaneously as exportables
and importables, rather than being limited to consider agriculture as the only
exportable activity.
To better understand why the Harris-Todaro economy and the 'wage curve'
economy lead to the same outcome regarding the direction of the impact on
variables, consider the following analysis. As I have pointed out, the
implementation of the CU protocol favours the expansion of some urban sectors,
which have a high positive RCA. This leads to the expansion of urban labour
demand and, as a result, to lower unemployment. Under the 'wage curve'
hypothesis, the urban wage rate has to increase. Thus, as a consequence of the CU
agreement, the expected urban wage rate rises under both assumptions postulated
for the labour market. The gap between the expected urban and rural wage rates is
eliminated through rural-urban migration and a rise in the rural wage rate.
Another striking result is that the impact of the CU agreement on migration
varies enormously among the two scenarios. If the urban wage rate is fixed, the CU
leads to the migration of 615,294 rural workers (6.4% of the Turkish agricultural
labour force), and the creation of 688,242 new urban jobs. Consequently, the
unemployment rate declines from a benchmark value of 11% to 9.8%. By contrast,
if the urban wage rate responds to the unemployment level, then the CU would still
favour the rural-urban migration flow, but the pressure on cities is estimated to be
30small (165,320 individuals). Furthermore, the creation of new urban jobs is
moderated by an urban wage increase of 1.6%, and the unemployment rate declines
to 9.4%. The different magnitude of the migration flow explains why real GNP in
urban areas increases by 3% in the Harris-Todaro scenario and by 1.5% in the
'wage curve' scenario, whereas real GNP in rural areas contracts by 10.3% in the
Harris-Todaro scenario and by 2.8% in the 'wage curve' scenario. The Harris-
Todaro scenario yields results which give rise to concerns referring to the exodus
from rural areas and the pressure upon the cities. If, as a consequence of the CU
agreement, migrant workers are followed by their families, 2-3 million potential
migrants would move from rural areas.
2
1 Furthermore, since this flow is
determined by the higher demand of labour, it is likely that migrants will settle in
the industrialised cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul and Izmir. These cities, already
congested, might not be able to absorb this huge number of people.
2
2 Thus,
although pull-factors induced movements of population among regions are
economically desirable, a population pressure of these dimensions would be so
large that the benefits of migration would be exceeded by the negative externalities
and the related urban costs of migration, such as congestion, pollution and crime.
2
1 According to official statistics in 1990 the average size Turkish household consisted of 5.05
individuals.
According to the 1997 General Population Register results, the Turkish population is
62,610,252 inhabitants. 9 million inhabitants (14,47%) live in Istanbul and 3 million inhabitants
(4,91%) live in Izmir.
31However, if the Turkish urban labour market is characterised by a 'wage curve',
the results of the simulations indicate that policy-makers should not worry about
the impact on internal migration; quite the opposite, they should welcome the
migration flow from rural areas, in order to avoid an excessive increase of the
urban real wage rate, due to the expansion of urban labour demand. Certainly,
econometric studies can give an important insight in understanding the features of
the Turkish urban labour market, which are essential for the adoption of
appropriate measures by policy-makers.
An additional interesting result is related to the impact on capital rent. The
theory argues that, under capital mobility, trade liberalisation results in a decline in
the return to capital, because the elimination of a tariff reduces the domestic price
of the imported good. Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the
rental on capital must decline as the urban wage is fixed to meet the unit cost
condition. But this is true only in the absence of intermediate inputs and if goods
are homogenous. Conversely, if goods are differentiated and industries employ
intermediate inputs, then this direct implication does not necessarily hold. In fact,
the trade model used in this study indicates that, as a result of the CU agreement,
capital rent increases by 3.9% in the Harris-Todaro scenario and by 3.3% in the
'wage curve' scenario.
32In summary, both scenarios suggest that the CU agreement brings about a
rise in welfare, a migration flow from rural to urban areas, the reduction of the
urban unemployment rate, a slight decline of the urban-rural wage gap and an
increase of the common capital rent. Thus, the results of the intersectoral intra-
industry trade model for Turkey are consistent with the recent results of the
theoretical dual economy literature regarding welfare, unemployment and the wage
gap, whilst they are counter intuitive as far as the impact on migration and the
capital rent are concerned.
4.2. The adoption of an optimal policy
I shall now examine the impact of a policy intervention, which is typically
suggested to enhance the welfare of a nation in the presence of internal migration
and urban unemployment. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) in a Harris-Todaro
context and, successively, Corden and Findlay (1975) in an intersectoral mobile
capital framework, both argue that the first best option is the elimination of the
causes of the urban wage rigidity. However, if this is not attainable, a uniform
wage subsidy financed by non-distorting taxes is the correct policy action to reduce
unemployment and increase welfare. As strongly emphasised by Corden and
Findlay (1975), the subsidising of the whole labour force would require a huge
amount of financial resources, which might not be available in a non-distorting
33way. In practice, countries with a weak domestic tax base might use indirect
taxation, or even protective trade policies, to subsidise the labour costs. Obviously,
this would not be an optimal policy intervention. For this practical reason, Corden
and Findlay (1975) argue against the optimal subsidising policy. There is also a
theoretical motivation why a uniform wage subsidy may not be an optimal policy
intervention. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) assume that the wage rate in the
high-wage sector remains fixed. However if, after the subsidising policy, the union
sector can re-agree the employment conditions for their members, then the wage
rate in the urban sector might rise to cream off more rents. As a result, the claim
that one should subsidise a union sector to restore first best efficiency is not
necessarily valid. In addition, the adoption of the Bhagwati and Srinivasan's
subsidy requires knowledge of the marginal product of labour when labour is
optimally distributed, but this is not observable. An advantage of this AGE model
for Turkey is that I can compute a set of uniform subsidies, which affect the
distribution of labour among sectors; thus I can identify the subsidy that maximises
welfare, when the union sector cannot cream off more rents.
The simulations reported in this section have been performed under the
Bhagwati and Srinivasan's assumptions that Turkey would be able to finance the
subsidising program with lump-sum taxes and the union sector does not intervene
(see Table 4). Under these strong hypotheses, the optimal ad valorem subsidy rates
34are equal to 10% (34.5%) of the rural wage rate in the rural sector and 5.6%
(19.1%) of the urban wage rate in the urban sector in the Harris-Todaro ('wage
curve') scenario. Given the effects of the trade agreement, this policy intervention
would increase welfare by a further 3% (3.9 billion of 1990 US dollars) in the
Harris-Todaro scenario, and by further 1.6% (2.1 billion of 1990 US dollars) in the
'wage curve' scenario. This implies that both the CU agreement and the uniform
wage subsidy policy would raise welfare by 6 billion US dollars at 1990 rates in
the Harris-Todaro scenario and 3.9 billion US dollars at 1990 rates in the 'wage
curve' scenario.
2
3 However, it would require additional lump-sum taxes equal
respectively to 2.6% and 12.3% of the GNP.
The subsidising of the entire labour market would largely contract the urban-
rural wage gap, and would also reverse the direction of the migration flow from
urban to rural areas. In fact, given the CU effects on migration, this policy
intervention, by modifying the cost of labour in rural and urban areas, would lead
to a re-migration flow of 809,009 workers in the Harris-Todaro scenario, and
1,171,089 workers in the 'wage curve' scenario. The reallocation of labour has a
substantial impact on sectoral output and GNP. In particular, real GNP in rural
areas would increase by 14.9% in the Harris-Todaro scenario and by 11.9% in the
2
3 The result that the social cost of trade distortions in the presence of the Harris-Todaro labour
market distortions is approximately double their cost when these labour distortions are ignored,
was also found by Clarete and Whalley (1988) in a AGE trade model for the Philippines.
35'wage curve' scenario, whilst real GNP in urban areas would slightly contract
under both assumptions postulated for the labour market. The optimal subsidising
policy would lead to full employment in the Harris-Todaro scenario and to a very
low unemployment rate equal to 1.2% in the 'wage curve' scenario.
Table 4 The impact of the CU and optimal uniform wage subsidy on
welfare, GNP, migration, unemployment, wages and rent
Hicksian equivalent income variation
(Billion 1990 TL)
Hicksian equivalent income variation index
Aggregate output
GNP in real terms
Real GNP in rural sector
Real GNP in urban sector
Lump-sum Taxes / GNP
Optimal ad valorem rural wage subsidy rate












































36It is clear that a uniform wage subsidy would have an extensive impact on
the Turkish economy, which is far greater that the impact of the CU agreement, in
particular with regard to welfare and unemployment. However, it would require a
large subsidising program financed by non-distorting taxes, which is not feasible.
As Corden and Findlay (1975) pointed out, a policy intervention of this kind is a
far-fetched proposal, because this solution is simply rendered impracticable by the
need to finance a universal subsidy.
5. Conclusion
Internal migration is an important population phenomenon in Turkey. Tens of
thousands of individuals migrate every year from eastern to western Turkey, in
order to improve their quality of life and that of their children. The 1996 CU
agreement between Turkey and the EU will have an impact on the migration flow;
however, it is not clear if it will further increase the number of individuals who
engage in rural-urban migration, or if this migration will change direction, since
agriculture is still widely protected by the trade agreement. I have computed the
direction of the migration flow and its dimension by applying a general
equilibrium analysis and by focusing on two key pull factors: the demand of labour
in urban areas and the wage gap between the place of destination and the place of
37origin. The model is based upon the Harris-Todaro job search hypothesis.
However, it considers two alternative explanations for unemployment in urban
areas, which result in two scenarios: the Harris-Todaro scenario, which is
characterised by a constant urban wage rate; and the 'wage curve' scenario, where
the urban wage rate is flexible and adjusted to urban unemployment.
It might be thought that the results of this kind of exercise would be highly
sensitive to the assumptions made about the labour market. One of the
contributions of this paper is to demonstrate that that is not the case. Whether a
Harris-Todaro approach or 'wage curve' approach is taken, it is shown here that
the CU agreement leads to: (i) a large welfare gain equal to 1.4%-1.6% of
consumer income; (ii) a migration flow from rural to urban areas, due to the large
expansion of manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, wearing apparel, footwear,
leather-fur products, for which Turkey has a comparative advantage; (iii) a fall in
the urban unemployment rate of 1-2 percentage points; (iv) a slight decline in the
urban-rural wage gap; (v) an increase in the capital rent by 3.3%-3.9%. The results
regarding welfare, unemployment and the wage gap are consistent with the dual
economy literature, whereas the results on migration and capital rent are counter
intuitive, because the AGE model of this study embodies intermediate inputs,
which allow for intersectoral interdependencies; assumes product differentiation to
38determine endogenously domestic prices; and assumes intra-industry trade, rather
than considering agriculture as the only exportable sector.
The results also indicate that the number of workers abandoning the rural
areas differ substantially among the two scenarios. The estimate is very large in the
Harris-Todaro scenario. In fact, if migrant workers are followed by their families,
then 2-3 million individuals (around 50%-75% of the migration flow, which has
been recorded between 1985 and 1990) would move from the rural areas. Pull-
factors induced movements of population among Turkish regions are economically
desirable. However, since this flow is determined by the higher demand of labour,
it is likely that migrants will settle in industrialised cities, such as Istanbul and
Izmir. The number of migrants would be too large to be easily absorbed by these
cities with the result that the negative externalities and the related urban costs of
migration may exceed the economic benefits. In addition, according to the OECD
(1996), 4,100,000 million Turkish workers (21 per cent of total employment) were
in the informal non-agricultural sector in 1993. Many migrants fail to find work in
the factories, and they often are forced to enter the informal urban sector. There,
they work as artisans, petty traders, taxi drivers, shoeshine boys, or day labourers
with the hope of being employed in the formal sector employment in
manufacturing or construction. If this feature of the Turkish labour market is also
39taken into account, then the estimates of the migration flow reported in this study
should be considered as a lower bound.
I have also computed the welfare gain when an optimal policy in the form of
a uniform wage subsidy rate is introduced. Such policy might be taken into
consideration if the urban wage rate remains sticky and if the pressure of migration
on urban areas would not decline. The findings indicate that welfare would
increase by 3%-4.5% of consumer income and unemployment would be
minimised. However, despite the large welfare gains, this policy intervention is not
advisable for two main reasons: firstly, it would require a large amount of financial
resources, which are generally not available in a lump-sum manner; secondly, the
assumption implicitly postulated by the dual economy literature that the high-wage
union sector would not bargain for a new collective contract is not credible.
It should be stressed that, although the assumptions postulated for the labour
market are not based upon an econometric testing procedure, the results of this
study, especially those on welfare and migration, can be of some interest to policy-
makers. Certainly, complementary econometric studies, which can characterise the
features of the labour market in Turkey in more detail, are essential for the
adoption of appropriate economic policy measures.
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